Kenneth Waltz argues that 'the story of international relations is written in terms of great powers'. 1 In his view, outcomes in the international system are determined by relations between great powers because great powers have immense material power capabilities. By contrast, middle powers have few resources to influence great powers either as competitors or as allies. 2 In the international system as Waltz conceptualizes it, middle powers are unlikely to have much influence.
Yet, as this article shows, Britain did exert considerable influence on U S policy and strategy during the opening phase of the Kennedy Trade Round (K TR ) of the G eneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G ATT). British influence is explained by the negotiating skills and experience of the British delegation in G eneva. 3 Britain was a middle power with few material power capabilities, but the non-material resources of state-actors were utilized to exert influence on a great power, influence which determined the outcome of the opening phase of the K TR . 4 The close diplomatic ties that are a feature of the Anglo-American relationship assisted British influence on the U S. Far from being 'played out', as former U S Secretary of State D ean Acheson would have us believe, the so-called Special Relationship provided the context for fruitful cooperation between Britain and the U S during the K TR . Existing accounts of the K TR have missed this British influence. These accounts are based either on the personal experience of U S officials or on secondary material, and written almost exclusively from an American perspective. 5 They concentrate on U S-European Economic Community 6 (EEC) dialogues, and little mention is made of other participants. This narrow focus, whilst understandable at the time of writing-when most official records were closed to public scrutiny-needs reexamination. Recently opened documents provide a broader perspective of the K TR negotiations and reveal an active and creative British role.
Background to the negotiations
The preliminary K TR discussions began in 1962 and were soon affected by French President de G aulle's rejection of British membership of the EEC in January 1963. This event both demonstrated the dominant influence of the French in EEC decision-making, an influence which would continue to be a key feature in the G ATT discussions, and gave renewed impetus to Anglo-American diplomacy. Since the onset of the Cold War, London and Washington had shared a long-term commitment to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe and had thus cultivated 'joint solutions to joint problems'.
7 G oing into the K TR , the joint problems they faced were not limited to high EEC tariffs; there were also the political difficulties caused by exclusion from EEC decision-making and French antiAtlanticism. The U S had supported and encouraged British membership of the EEC, in the expectation that it would boost U S influence in Europe via Britain. Of course, this joint interest was precisely the reason de G aulle blocked British membership, fearing Britain would be a Trojan horse for U S influence. Indeed, the non to British membership demonstrated that the EEC countries, especially France, took for granted that the Anglo-American relationship was close and was an important factor in U S foreign policy.
French wariness of U S intentions in Europe restricted the opportunities for direct U S influence on EEC policy during the G ATT discussions. Britain, however, had an ace up its sleeve. It was a full participant in various European organizations, such as the Western European U nion (WEU ) and the European Free Trade Association (EF TA) which had long been negotiating with the EEC on trade matters. These links, and persistent British efforts to join the EEC had established channels of The importance of middle powers in the GATT H ow the G ATT system, a post-World War II multilateral trade organization based around a small institution lacking formal decision-making powers, generated cooperation between rival trading nations and blocs is an interesting question. One answer is that U S leadership and/or hegemony was the decisive factor. 9 Young's recent analysis of regime formation demonstrates, however, that structural power alone cannot produce cooperation. H egemonic leaders, he argues, need to employ leadership skills to invent 'institutional options' (regimes) to encourage cooperation. 10 Still, the focus is on the influence of major states in regime formation and management. 11 Accounts of the K TR written in the early 1970s, a time when signs of U S hegemonic decline were all too evident, argue that the difficulties the U S faced due to its declining hegemony weakened its hand in the G ATT negotiations. N o longer a hegemon, the U S could not impose its liberal trade policy in Western Europe. Indeed such actions would have proved counterproductive given French antiAtlanticism. Thus the relative weakness of U S leadership, especially vis-à-vis the EEC, becomes the decisive factor in explaining the outcome of the K TR .
State D epartment officials tended to see the K TR as one of the 'immediate issues of key importance in Europe'. 12 This affected the U S negotiating position vis-à-vis the EEC whose tactics were very much influenced by the perception that the U S could not afford a failure of the Round. It 'encouraged the belief that the American negotiators would finally be forced either to increase their own concessions or accept a level of offers from others previously rejected as inadequate'. 13 The emergence of the EEC as a powerful actor was the major difficulty confronting the U S in the negotiations. U S leadership of the G ATT was for the first time being tested.
The successful outcome of the K TR is usually explained with reference to the series of mostly conflicting dialogues between the U S and the EEC. As scholars weave through this conflict, waged largely over industrial and agricultural tariffs, they Contrary to this widely accepted view, I find that the context of the Special Relationship provided an opportunity for British influence at the K TR . Influence is a crucial concept in the study of politics. G enerally, it is defined as 'the modification of one actor's behaviour by another'. 16 M ore specifically, influence here is defined as the modification of U S behaviour by Britain. U S and British government documents of the period reveal this influence on a number of significant issues during the G ATT discussions. H ere, the preparatory phase of the negotiations from 1962, through the M inisterial M eetings in M ay 1963 and M ay 1964 launching the Round, to the tabling of industrial exceptions in N ovember 1964, is examined.
Anglo-American relations and the KTR
Though the Special Relationship in the 1960s did not have the strategic significance it had during World War II and the early Cold War period, the history of the relationship created a network of elite-level linkages. These persisted and helped facilitate dialogue between the two states. D uring the 1960s, Anglo-American diplomacy was brought to bear on several issues: Cuba, Vietnam, the trilateral negotiations with West G ermany, and the British sterling crisis. The conflict of interests and difficulty in achieving common positions over these issues strained the relationship, providing plentiful evidence of divergent interests. The economic 518 Donna L ee decline of Britain and the asymmetries of power between the two states meant that Britain's significance to the U S, at best, fluctuated. Adopting the Achesonian logic, most conclude that the Anglo-American relationship was a British myth. 17 Plainly, few who study the strategic and military aspect of Anglo-American relations think otherwise.
18 N evertheless, examination of the trade diplomacy aspect of the relationship in a European context suggests the continued relevance of the relationship to both.
As large trading nations, the U S and Britain shared a vital interest in maintaining and extending the international liberal trade system. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw increasing exports as the remedy for growing budget deficits. Britain, whose exports accounted for 13.5 per cent of its gross national product, sought to halt its economic decline through the same means. 19 In contrast, the EEC countries were trying to build and extend common external tariffs and increase intra-European trade. Though economic liberalism forms the core of the Treaty of Rome, they had less interest in supporting liberalization of particular trade interests, especially agriculture.
The convergence of U S and British economic interests led to shared diplomatic concerns within the European context. Both countries wanted to increase their influence in Europe in order to restrain the protectionist impulse of the EEC and counter the growing anti-Atlanticism fostered by de G aulle. British trade with Europe was increasing: 40 per cent of Britain's trade was with the EEC, and only 15 per cent with N orth America, a powerful economic reason to seek EEC membership. The U S encouraged and supported British entry, primarily because of the political advantages. Britain was the closest of allies, and British policy towards Europe fell in line with that of the U S. British membership, it was argued, would increase the influence of both in Europe. These economic and political interests came together in the K TR , leading to high levels of tactical and policy collaboration in a concerted effort to complete the negotiations.
Conditions for British influence
Britain was the foremost economic and political ally of the U S in the negotiations, and the pre-existing Special Relationship facilitated cooperation between the two. These factors alone, however, are not sufficient to explain British influence. Other conditions were necessary. They were: (1) the existence of conflict between the two major participants-the U S and the EEC; (2) a similarity of British and U S trade interests; (3) a tendency of Britain and the U S to adopt joint policy positions, especially when they faced opposition from the EEC. The structure of G ATT is also important. Cox and Jacobson's study of influence in international organizations provides a useful framework for understanding decision-making in the G ATT. They categorize the G ATT as a 'forum' organization, meaning it provides the framework of decision-making on international trade issues but does not make decisions itself or conduct an independent trade policy. 20 Policy-making remains the responsibility of states acting within the context of the organization. The context of the organization sets the rules and procedures for the conduct of decision-making. In contrast, international organizations that make policy decisions independently of states are described as 'service' organizations. 21 This distinction is highly significant. As a 'forum' organization the G ATT lacked a large bureaucratic staff: its secretariat in the 1960s numbered less than 400. This removes a set of actors seen as a significant variable in the decision-making processes of 'service' organizations. Without this layer of actors, influence in the G ATT is the preserve of national representatives and their advisers, not the officials and executives of the G ATT organization. As the key actors in the K TR , mostly sheltered from domestic and pressure-group politics as I explain below, their communications and reports tell the main story of the negotiations. What follows is an analysis of some of the deliberations of the British and U S participants.
M iddle powers in the global

Early conflicts: agriculture and tariff formulae
The U S Trade Expansion Act (TEA) of October 1962 gave the President powers to negotiate tariff reductions with other countries and provided the impetus for preparatory trade talks leading to the launch of the K TR in M ay 1963. The TEA gave the U S executive authority to seek tariff cuts of 50 per cent on a linear basis (as opposed to the item-by-item approach of previous trade negotiations). It specifically mentioned the aim of reducing tariffs on agricultural products as well as industrial products. The U S laid out these two fundamental goals in preliminary meetings with the EEC and Britain. Although there was consensus on the need to reduce trade barriers, the EEC had basic differences with the U S over its two key demands. The EEC was reluctant to include agriculture so early in the negotiations pending internal agreement on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Six also resisted adoption of a 50 per cent linear tariff cut without a formula to level out tariff disparities. They pointed to the high level of several U S tariffs compared to European ones, which meant that even after 50 per cent reduction, U S tariffs would remain higher than European rates. From the onset of the negotiations, this conflict between tariff reduction (the U S position) and tariff harmonization (the EEC position) posed a problem.
These basic differences had to be overcome before the K TR could get started. Britain was perhaps more eager than any other country to jump-start the negotiations. Since Britain had failed to become a member of the EEC, completion of the K TR was essential to British trade interests as the only means of removing trade barriers between the EEC and EF TA, of which Britain was a member. The Six were wary of an 'Anglo-American D irectorate' in the K TR , and tended to resist British just as much as American pressure.
22 F urthermore, the prospect of future British membership reduced the value of British offers at the K TR . Any tariff cuts Britain offered might have only temporary benefit. For these reasons, Britain's negotiating influence was mainly with the U S and the other EF TA countries.
The British position on both the points at issue between the U S and the EEC was delicate but equivocal. On agriculture, Britain generally supported the U S position for tactical reasons. British interest in EEC reductions in agricultural tariffs was slight. Trade in agricultural products with the EEC was minimal, and the system of Commonwealth preferences meant that Britain maintained high agricultural tariffs itself. Trade with the EEC was mostly in industrial products, and it was tariffs on these that Britain wanted to reduce. The difficulty with this was that from the outset the U S emphasized the importance of reductions in agricultural tariffs. Britain feared that if the U S failed to obtain a satisfactory agreement on agriculture, the K TR would fall at the first hurdle. Indeed, British diplomats acknowledged during the four years of negotiations that the 'Kennedy Round will succeed or fail in the agricultural sector'. 23 Britain adopted a strategy of persuading the U S to push ahead on industrial tariff discussions to avoid an impasse, while providing assurances that Britain was fully supportive of the U S position on agricultural tariffs and would actively pursue the inclusion of agriculture in later discussions.
US policy shifts
From the passage of the TEA in October 1962 to the tabling of industrial exceptions lists in N ovember 1964, the U S negotiators accepted compromise deals on the two fundamental issues outlined above: the linear tariff formula and agricultural tariffs. Both required major shifts in U S policy.
At the M ay 1963 G ATT M inisterial M eeting the U S accepted a compromise on the general rules on industrial products, namely, a 50 per cent linear tariff reduction as a working hypothesis rather than as the binding rule the U S had pressed for since the opening of discussions. Industrial tariffs would be subject to a 50 per cent reduction, but countries would be allowed to draw up exceptions to this. Consequently, most tariff reductions would not be negotiated on a linear basis, but itemby-item as discussions concentrated on the exceptions lists.
The U S and the British agreed that exceptions lists should be kept to a minimum. Concerted efforts took place to create a formula to set quantitative limits. 24 Again the U S representatives found themselves at odds with their EEC counterparts who argued that U S insistence on the 50 per cent reduction would necessitate large exceptions lists due to the problem of disparities already identified in the initial discussions. The Six, therefore, would not accept a formula restricting exceptions. Instead, the EEC put forward its so-called écrétment plan, which proposed unequal M iddle powers in the global economy 521 linear cuts to harmonize tariffs and thus limit the need for exceptions. The U S rejected the écrétment formula on the technical grounds that it went beyond the authority of the TEA since it required the cutting of some tariffs by more than 50 per cent. The essential difference between the U S percentage formula and the EEC écrétment plan was one of lower tariffs versus harmonization. This issue loomed so large that it threatened the launch of the K TR . Yet by the next G ATT M inisterial M eeting of M ay 1964 the U S had dropped its formula and accepted a compromise deal drawn up by the British, a deal which owed more to the EEC line than that of the U S. This was a big shift in U S policy.
Another example of U S flexibility occurred in the agricultural sector. In M ay 1963 the U S held fast to its desire to see agricultural tariffs included in the initial negotiations. By M ay 1964 it came away from the M inisterial M eeting with no such commitment from the EEC, yet it tabled industrial exceptions in N ovember 1964 despite the lack of progress in agriculture.
These U S policy shifts were not the result of Congressional pressures or of intradepartmental politics. The strongest indication that domestic influences were absent is that these would have prevented the U S negotiators from accommodating British and EEC priorities. The Congressional line at the time was clearly protectionist; any influence it may have had would have resulted in a harder line vis-à-vis the EEC, particularly on agriculture. A powerful Congress would not have allowed the shunting of discussion on agricultural tariffs. Besides, Congress was not an influential factor. Though the U S Constitution assigned Congress prime responsibility for trade policy, executive autonomy was secured by the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Act and the TEA in 1962. The State D epartment was insulated from Congressional pressures at this time. G eorge Ball, U S U nder-Secretary of State, told Board of Trade (BOT) officials 'Congress was more noisy than effective' and that it 'could not affect the negotiations in the Kennedy Round'. 25 N or can U S flexibility, especially the climbdown on agriculture, be explained by intra-departmental politics. H ere we would expect to find a shift in influence away from Agriculture to State. But, according to one account, Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, was a marginal figure in trade policy discussions. 26 State, it seems, was always in a dominant position in the trade policy process. 27 Another possible source of influence which might explain the shifts in U S policy would be the EEC. H owever, as stated above, the relationship between the U S and the EEC was difficult. There was little agreement between the two on either broad policy outlines or particular tariff issues. The EEC was not committed to a successful K TR , being more interested in the establishment of the Common External Tariff. This stance produced a reluctance to compromise. French dominance within the EEC had the potential to disrupt the entire K TR . Christian H erter, U S Special Trade Representative (STR ), acknowledged that 'the French did not necessarily wish the K TR to succeed' and that ' [d] the whole process'. 28 This lack of goodwill on the part of the EEC, coupled with the anti-Atlanticism of de G aulle, created a lack of trust between the U S and the EEC, limiting the prospects for successful negotiations.
Clothing the emperor: Anglo-American economic diplomacy
A much better explanation for U S policy compromises, as is clearly evident in the documents, is British influence. As early as N ovember 1962, the British and U S participants were meeting to exchange ideas and work out joint positions for the K TR .
29 M any similar meetings would follow during the course of the Round. In analysing two years of such meetings from N ovember 1962 to N ovember 1964, the aim here is to identify two aspects of British influence: (1) how British influence shaped the U S view of the K TR negotiations; (2) how Britain influenced the stakes the U S weighed in their own calculations.
The main tactic of the British in these early meetings was to urge the U S to take the lead in the negotiations, and to encourage the U S to offer compromises to the EEC to prevent deadlock. At the M ay 1964 M inisterial M eeting the adoption of the British formula for industrial exceptions and agreement to delay agricultural tariff talks were sufficient to get the K TR officially started. BOT and F O documents indicate exactly how hard British officials worked to achieve the necessary shifts in U S tactics and policy. D avid Ormsby-G ore, British Ambassador in Washington, cabled:
we had another good talk with H erter this morning and found ourselves in general agreement on strategy for the M ay 4th meeting and the immediately following period in G ATT discussions. I think it is now much less likely the Americans will allow themselves to be led into a public confrontation with the Six at the M inisterial meeting. Briefs for the bilateral talks with U S officials written by the BOT and the U K M inistry of Agriculture, F isheries and Food (M AF F ) indicate the intention of the British to attempt to reconcile the differences between the U S and EEC positions. 33 N oting that preliminary discussions at the M ay 1963 meeting had failed to solve these problems, the BOT brief pointed out that 'the U.S. government will shortly face crucial decisions between risking the failure of the negotiations and modifying their own objectives and approach'. The report went on to say that the State D epartment would be more flexible and more inclined to want to avoid a showdown compared to the D epartment of Agriculture and that Christian H erter 'may stand somewhere in between'. Recognizing the more effective route for British influence, the report recommended that 'our officials should work as closely as possible together with G overnor H erter's office and the State D epartment in considering the best means of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion'. 34 The F O brief was candid in its assessment of which particular U S officials were more receptive to British influence. It recommended that 'Sir Robert Powell should meet M r H erter because he has an open mind and M r Ball because he was amenable to argument', and suggested that his visit in February 1964 'might provide an opportunity to influence M r Ball and M r H erter at a time when the Americans were beginning to re-appraise their policy, but while their thinking was still at a formative stage'. 35 The M AF F brief argued that the U S position on agriculture and its insistence on a linear-cuts approach were 'too rigid'. Britain must address the EEC-U S impasse using the Anglo-American relationship in order to 'encourage the Americans not to adopt too negative an attitude to the Community's proposals' 36 and 'to prevent the U nited States demand for concessions on agriculture being pressed so far as to endanger the prospect of an exchange of concessions on the duties on industrial products'.
37
A subsequent account of three-way 'private talks' over dinner between British, U S and Community officials illustrates the crucial role of the British. In a letter to the F O, William H ughes, a member of the British delegation, reported frank discussions with Theodorus H ijzen and Jean Rey of the Commission. From these H ughes gleaned that the EEC members were keen to pursue bilateral talks with the British as a solution to the impasse with the U S. Rey spoke of 'our British friends' and was receptive to the British 'compromise on the lines of the M ontan draft'. H ughes illustrated the tensions between the U S and EEC, referring to an instance when 'G eorge Ball came along and gave Rey quite a good dressing down'. 38 The British compromise suggested a varied approach to agricultural tariffs, involving commodity agreements for major primary products such as cereals, linear cuts for processed food products, and assurances of access for other products. This was not 524 Donna L ee the linear approach the U S sought, but it was a proposal the EEC would willingly consider. 39 At least it would provide a formula to kick-start agricultural negotiations.
F urther talks in Washington in April presented the British with another opportunity to persuade American officials to change their opinion of what could be expected from these opening-stage negotiations. The British focused their energies on discussions with State D epartment officials and the Office of the U nited States Trade Representative (U STR ). N oting French reluctance to proceed with the negotiations, R ichard Powell judged that 'the French would be more or less satisfied to have nothing happen in the Kennedy Round'. 40 Powell voiced concerns about the rigidity of the U S delegation's approach to the EEC, especially over agriculture, cautioning that if the U S pushed too hard the Six might abort the negotiations completely. The U S officials responded positively to British suggestions, showing a 'readiness . . . to explore the agriculture field sector by sector' which 'corresponds to our own suggestions'. 41 The British proposal encouraged consensus at the M ay 1964 M inisterial M eeting at which the K TR was officially launched. The outcome did not fully satisfy the U S, but delighted the British. The negotiations on industrial tariffs could now go ahead. From the outset the priority of Britain had been to secure reciprocal cuts across the board in the industrial sector.
Following the M inisterial M eeting, discussion centred on industrial tariff disparities which would result from the 50 per cent linear reduction. N egotiations between the U S, Britain, and the EEC concentrated on reaching agreement on precise rules for these disparities.
The EEC position, largely the product of French policy, sought harmonization of industrial tariffs by using the écrétment plan, which could not be accomplished with a fixed percentage linear cut (the U S position), according to the EEC, because of existing tariff differentials. The EEC advocated the écrétment plan as an alternative. It would require existing high tariffs to be reduced by a greater percentage than lower ones to remove tariff disparities. This proposal failed to get off the ground, because the British and the U S strongly opposed it. The British and the U S had managed to agree alternatives to the EEC plan based on allowing exceptions to the linear tariff. Anglo-American cooperation on industrial tariffs had been achieved very early in discussions following the passage of the TEA in 1962. In N ovember that year officials from the State D epartment and the BOT had established a joint position on the 50 per cent linear cut. 42 The EEC agreed to the proposal to modify the U S linear formula on the basis of exceptions. But this concession brought further EEC-U S conflict over an agreed formula on exceptions. At first, the U S argued that a quantitative limit should be set to exceptions. 43 The EEC argued that U S insistence on a 50 per cent cut would M iddle powers in the global economy 525 influence in shaping U S views, tactics and policies in areas vital to U S economic interests. That Britain was no longer a great power, and was certainly less determined (and less able) to maintain a world role in the 1960s, did not prevent it from enjoying significant influence in the G ATT system. Britain's reduced economic and military power meant that other resources had to be applied in order to influence outcomes. D ean Rusk recognized this much better than his predecessor, D ean Acheson. In a memorandum to President Johnson in 1967 he argued that 'The British are still prepared to play a constructive part in helping maintain world order but they must now rely on ideas and dexterity rather than military might'.
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Conclusion
Because of the dominance of U S realist approaches to the study of international political economy (IPE) we have become accustomed to the great-power world of international relations. But unless we give attention to the role of middle-level participants in the IPE we cannot understand fully the evolution of cooperation. Recent trends such as the enlargement of the European U nion, the creation of regional trade blocs like NAF TA and APEC, and the growing numbers and size of private actors such as multinational corporations both generate and represent a diffusion of power in the IPE, reducing the ability of hegemonic powers to dictate outcomes. Therefore, an understanding of the influence of actors other than the great powers is essential to understanding the contemporary IPE. This article is a case-study of such influence, using the example of Britain in the early 1960s to illustrate conditions which gave rise to multilateral cooperation in the G ATT based upon the actions of a middle power. The focus has been on state-level actors.
One further point: D ean Acheson's consignment of the Special Relationship to the history books is shown to have been premature. In the opening phase of the K TR this relationship proved essential to the realization of U S as well as British economic and political interests. This and other recent archival research suggests that most previous studies significantly overstate the atrophy of Anglo-American relations in this period. Though not having the role of the 'G reeks in the Roman Empire', as H arold M acmillan sentimentally claimed in 1943, Britain still exercised significant influence in Washington in the 1960s.
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